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Introduction
This paper explains conceptual lapses in the discourses of transition and 
reform in post-war societies. Critical, is the fluidity that characterizes no-
tions of survivor and victim in the context of peace and justice. Transitional 
interventions continuously create victims of war in their attempt to create 
survivors of war. Although my focus is northern Uganda, I also draw exam-
ples from other parts of the world. I argue that legal inclusiveness, mar-
ket inclusivity, and resolved antecedents of conflicts create conditions that 
facilitate implementation processes of integration, settlement, and recon-
struction of post-war societies. Creating “survivability” is a collective work 
of surviving communities, national, local, and other exogenous entities. 
The way reform processes are played out in transitional period stems from 
how international agencies, national governments, civil societies, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and local actors deploy human and material re-
sources towards recovery.
The paper highlights significant processes and stages in the struc-
ture and span of war, showing how time is an important variable in the 
broader discourses of transition and reform. It examines how war begins 
and ends, and how societies emerging from war interrogate the logic of 
transition, peace, and justice. By so doing, it explicates how political reform 
paradigm galvanizes momentum from the state, humanitarian agencies, 
international diplomacy, and local actors to articulate survivors’ justice. 
Using examples from northern Uganda, war is understood as a continual 
process whose axis of time is more complicated than has been assumed. 
Typically, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) war with the government of 
President Yoweri Museveni “began” in 1986 and “ended” in 2005. There 
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are conventional markers of beginning and ending of a war. War starts 
when two or more groups raise conflicts to arms confrontation. War ends 
when guns go silent and belligerents sign truce. Because the beginning 
of a war is rather complex, it is easy to bring warring parties together, but 
often difficult to handle complexities and altercations emerging out of set-
tlement and restoration. Conventional understanding of concepts related 
to war and peace posit lapses, which indicate that social justice can never 
be achieved outside political justice. Although survivors’ justice requires 
liberality, there is need to check that liberality if post-war societies must 
recuperate faster. This argument is based on a major claim that war is not 
necessarily a one-dimensional experience of tragedy, loss, and pain. War is 
also an experience of opportunity, gain, and advancement.
The War in northern Uganda
In summary, political violence in post-independent Uganda can be plotted 
periodically as, the 1966 constitutional crisis, Idi Amin’s military coup of 
1971, the controversial 1980 elections leading to the Luwero Triangle Bush 
War, the 1985 coup by General Okello Lutwa, and the ousting of General 
Lutwa’s Junta government by Yoweri Museveni in 1986. Post 1986 incur-
sions saw the Uganda People’s Army (UPA) in eastern Uganda, Allied Dem-
ocratic Front (ADF) in western Uganda, the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), 
the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), the Holy Spirit Army (HSA), 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda, all making at-
tempts to topple the government of President Museveni (Branch 2011). In 
the process, all these groups, and others not mentioned unleashed waves 
of violence on the people, the economy, and the social fabric of the na-
tion. A key problem for post-independent Uganda has been the problem 
of non-democratic change of governments, ethnicized political organiza-
tions, the army’s involvement in political affairs, and inept political bureau-
cracy (Kasozi, 1994; Avigran, 1992). This paper focuses on post 1986 vio-
lence in which the LRA and the National Resistance Army (NRA) were key 
players. Adam Branch (2011) shows “anti-civilian violence” of this period as 
manifesting in torture, killing, forced displacement, and deprivation of the 
local population by both the NRA and LRA. The LRA’s attempt to purge the 
population by creating a “new Acholi” after wiping out the lot “corrupted” 
by Museveni, made maiming, mass abduction, mass killings, and destruc-
tion of villages, modes of “pacifying” Acholi (ibid. 71). The Uganda People’s 
Defense Forces (UPDF) in 1990 ordered all civilians to move to “internment 
camps”, hypothetically to cut off supplies of food, information, and poten-
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tial abductees from the rebels. Branch argues that this move constituted 
top-level violence in that the humanitarian crisis that followed was even 
worst than the war itself (ibid. 92-3). The paper examines how different 
actors, namely the state, humanitarian bodies, Non Governmental Organ-
izations (NGOs), and survivors engage discourses of reform to transit to a 
life beyond violence. I have emphasized experiences of survivors in Attiak, 
Lukodi, Abia, and Barlonyo because these places do not only represent the 
worst of the LRA incursions, but they also have attracted interventions in 
post-war period, perhaps more than any other places. The paper examines 
the nature and character of survivors in such places to see the type of in-
terventions and reform that can help such communities to transit better to 
an era of peace.
Transition as justice
Transition from war to peace, or from poverty to prosperity, is not possible 
without justice. Required in this debate, is understanding of justice itself. 
In a survey done by the International Center for Transitional Justice and 
Human Rights in the four northern and eastern Uganda districts of Gulu, 
Kitgum, Lira, and Soroti, in 2005, majority of respondents defined justice 
as trial. Such a definition was shaped by experiences of massacres in Barl-
onyo, Lukodi, Odek and other places. In non-Acholi districts of Soroti and 
Lira, justice was defined as reconciliation, truth and fairness1. Recent inter-
views with survivors and victims in these places reflect justice as assistance 
to victims. In the post-return period, survivors have prioritized rebuilding 
of infrastructure, providing of compensations to war claimants and vigi-
lantes like Amuka and Arrow Boys militia, total elimination of the LRA, 
improvement of education, and enhancement of community livelihoods as 
urgent concerns. An association of war veterans in northern Uganda sued 
the NRM government for failing to restock the region. Justice Byamukama 
Mugenyi of the High Court of Uganda ruled in the year 2014 that govern-
ment should pay the people of Lango region, shillings 2.9 trillion in com-
pensation for the lost livestock.2 When these colossal figures will be paid is 
yet to be known.
That understanding of justice shows transition as mediation of spac-
es, time, and experiences between ex-combatants, former communities of 
violence, and post-war communities in ways that mitigate past conflicts. 
1 Forgotten Voices, July 2005, Written by The International Center for Transitional Justice and 
Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, p. 23
2 Radio Wa (Our Community Radio) 89.9 news bulletin of 18th March 2015.
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It presupposes a re-examination of how political, legal, and sociological 
differences between conflicting forces can be harmonized, after keeping 
adrift for a long time. In the context of ex-combatants being reintegrated 
into civilian lives, transition means new communities are being created out 
of agglomeration of former nemeses. As Ruti G. Teital (2000) says, it is legal 
and political instruments that mediate transition. Teital argues that for just 
transition in post-war societies to be achieved, legal responses should be 
measured on democratic frameworks (2000:3). She contends that demo-
cratic development is essential for a meaningful transition, but at the same 
time, wonders whether law is capable of building a democratic culture. In 
a sense, transition should be liberalized, and for this to happen, it should 
have its modus operandi. In response to amnesty that was declared by the 
NRM government in 1999, many LRA combatants aided by Acholi Religious 
Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) came back. Non Governmental Organi-
zations (NGOs) like World Vision, The Invisible Children, and Sponsoring 
Children Uganda, amongst others participated in transition from violence, 
displacement, and destruction, to peace, stability, and recovery. To achieve 
this, respondents in Attiak, Barlonyo, Lukodi, and Abia in northern Ugan-
da contend that the LRA had made it impossible for people to act and move 
freely since most of them were padlocked in camps. Now that peace has 
“returned”, communities should be given ample space to speak about the 
war and to move without hindrance to transact business. Human rights 
protection then becomes a fundamental requirement for the restoration 
of peace after the guns have gone silent. Many people of northern Ugan-
da have often seen human rights as “life with peace and security without 
fear”.
Most NGOs preferred corrective and restorative forms of justice as op-
posed to retributive justice, arguing that transition requires inclusion of 
everybody’s labour including that of former war combatants. Some bring 
back innovative skills and experiences acquired from the bush, which can 
be used to rebuild a community ravaged by their own activities. Some sur-
vivors who suffered heavier casualties preferred the retributive type3. In a 
situation where modes of operation between relevant stakeholders con-
flict, the very output of transition itself is flawed. To effect liberal change 
and democratic transformation suggested by Teitel, both retributive and 
corrective forms of justice would have to be enforced. The retributive type 
should however be enforced with caution. Survivors need to play an active 
role in determining its mechanisms instead of allowing state courts and 
3 Interview: Residents of Guloi in Apala.
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legal systems to monopolize administration of punishment. The ARLPI nev-
er advocated for retributive justice because of the mixed-up composition 
of former combatants that included formerly abducted children, mothers, 
abducted NGO workers, and women. Many of the abducted children, and 
those born in the bush who enrolled in the LRA ranks would be led to launch 
destructive raids against their own villages, so as to severe all possibilities 
of return. Such acts would discourage them from ever thinking of escaping 
to return home. For this category, most communities in northern Uganda 
preferred corrective justice. For top commanders like Joseph Kony, Ken-
neth Banya, and Okot Odiambo, they preferred “retributive” justice where 
survivors would also participate in determining their fate. Upon the visit of 
Fatou Bensouda in Barlonyo in 2015, the people of Barlonyo suggested that 
Dominic Ongwen should be tried in Barlonyo. The ARPI also argued that 
a uniform system of justice should apply to all ex-combatants returning 
home. In northern Uganda, it was clear that Amnesty was a mechanism of 
peace being imposed from above. Most communities of northern Uganda 
understood amnesty as applicable to combatants that excluded the LRA top 
commanders4. Small conflicts between notorious commanders and survi-
vors’ families were not uncommon.5 Although survivors’ justice is a para-
digm that calls for alternative non-criminal trials, mato oput and kayo Cuk 
in Acholi and Lango had challenges in handling deep-seated transitional 
grievances against top LRA commanders. Besides, churches preach mes-
sages of reconciliation and forgiveness, which do not meet the approval of 
most victims6. Some Christianized survivors’ communities see traditional 
trial systems as Satanic,7 thus, raising critical questions about trauma and 
healing. As one survivor remarked, forgiveness or reconciliation can never 
happen unless trauma is completely healed.8
 Effective transition presupposes accountability for past wrongs (Tei-
tel, 2000: 5). There must be “rules of recognition” governing transitions au-
thoritarian rule to democracy, from poverty to prosperity, from lawlessness 
to the rule of law, and from war to peace. Weary of backward lashes, that 
transition can as well mean moving from a state of war to a state of anarchy, 
4 Interview: Local council leaders in Attiak and Barlonyo where mass massacres occurred in 
April 1995.
5 Interview: Komakech John Ogwok of Kitgum Peace and Documentation Centre.
6 New Vision, Thursday January 29 2015, “UPC backs ICC trial of Ongwen”, p. 7.
7 Interviews: local clan heads of Onywal Ipyeda and Okarowok in Lango complain about the 
limitations of traditional justice systems.
8 Interview: Akec Mary of Barlonyo who lost her husband and two children in the Barlonyo 
massacre of 21st February 2004.
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or from war to another form of war, the role of democratic processes in 
marking transition is pivotal. For reintegration of ex-combatants, there is 
need to move away from a transition that only centers on the democratic 
principle of free and fair elections (ibid). Democracy is then, re-conceptu-
alized as inclusion of survivors’ voices, to a large extent, decentering it from 
public dominance. Survivors’ liberty to articulate their voices on post-war 
processes, such as the position of ex-combatants, victims and perpetrators, 
is what constitutes democracy. There is a theory that transition ends when 
all “politically significant groups have embraced the rule of law (ibid). This 
theory does not take into account how factors like reparation; the healing 
of trauma, and compensations impacts the rule of law. Aggrieved persons 
are likely to embrace the rule of law if they feel that justice has been done 
to all parties implicated in the war.
To examine the role of legal phenomena in transition along a “trans-
formative continuum”, transitional processes define a period that seeks 
restoration of what has been impaired by war. We interrogate the functions 
of law in a transitional context, particularly the need to protect victims and 
survivors from different forms of abuses. In northern Uganda, victims are 
a category, which is [ir]reversibly incapacitated physically, psychologically, 
and economically by the war. Their exposure to the media and other public 
spaces should be regulated, sanctioned, or even censored. Different bodies 
have tended to take undue advantage of victims of violence for economic 
profiteering. The practice of profiling and displaying pictures of victims of 
violence for business or “advocacy” reasons is one reason why legal inter-
ventions are vital in transition. Interviewing and display of victims, some 
of them under aged persons, in print and electronic spaces is purportedly 
done to mobilize resources for transition. How much of these resources 
reach beneficiaries is more often questionable. Such displays also raise 
ethical concerns.
 Rule of law is also examined in the context of punishment, repara-
tions, purges, constitution making, rehabilitation, and projects that char-
acterize transitional period (ibid 6). During transition, rule of law is appli-
cable to ex-combatants, victims, survivors, including auxiliary actors such 
as Red Cross and all humanitarian agencies. In the case of ex-combatants, 
the rule of law would facilitate inclusion or absorption into civilian life. 
First, it is assumed that the rule of law can help war actors to adjust to a 
peaceful living. Second, that the rule of law will regulate social behavior of 
war parties in post-conflict communities. This may be true, but there are 
psychosocial processes that can make them adjust to the rule of law. Most 
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former child soldiers in northern Uganda were first received at reception 
centers from where they were given such support.9 There is need for nor-
mative shifts in both war returnees and receiving communities, especially 
those that are likely to negate reintegration. The role of community based 
organizations in propagating basic sensitization on new ways of coexist-
ence is essential here. Above all, it is important to explore ways in which 
laws that govern rebels in the bush can be appropriated in constructing 
practical possibilities of administering a workable rule of law. As Teitel has 
argued, “adhering to the rule of law during political upheavals is a diffi-
cult undertaking (ibid, 11). Often tensions exist between the rule of law in 
transition. As societies emerging from war transit, the rule of law also has 
to transit; it has to be flexible with political and sociological demands of a 
society seeking its bearing from violence to non-violence. In this case the 
rule of law is never independent since it flourishes in a democratic space. 
As Teitel explains, the rule of law serves to mediate “normative shifts in 
values that characterize these extraordinary periods” (ibid). The rule of law 
has to appropriate itself to a certain flexibility that makes it possible for for-
mer agents of anarchistic communities to adjust to juridical cultures. Teitel 
has explained this as the conflict between “predecessor” and “successor” 
justice systems (ibid, 12). The tension it presupposes is that returnees from 
the bush will be reintegrated into a political dispensation in which the rule 
of law is supreme, yet they bring back with them cultures and traditions 
shaped by a different “rule of law”. In the bush, rebels do not operate with-
out laws. They also adhere to a quasi-statist rule of law in rebel held terri-
tories. In that jurisdiction they administer punishments, reparations, and 
reprieve basing on sham, spurious laws. For children, women, and men 
abducted in northern Uganda adherence to such laws shaped them to see 
the LRA systems of brutality as justice, or a holy way of life.
In the “predecessor system of law, methods such as indoctrination, 
threats, bizarre rituals, and forced killings were used to reorient captives 
and recreate them into new personalities befitting bush life. The dilemma 
of transition is to determine how all these may be uprooted or destabilized 
in a transitional process where a different system of law is in force.10 Thus, 
to agree with Teitel, “the dilemma raised by successor criminal justice 
9 “Forgotten Voices, A population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace and Justice in 
Northern Uganda”, International Justice Center and the Human Rights Center, University of 
California, Berkeley.
10 For similar arguments about sources of law in transitional contexts, see “Land Rights and the 
Peoples of Africa, Historical, Legal and Anthropological Perspectives, Overview: Analysis and 
Contexts”, pp. 2, 25
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leads to broader questions about the theory of the nature of rule of law in 
transformation toward a liberal state (ibid). Teital adds that in times of sig-
nificant political change conventional understandings of the rule of law are 
thrown into relief (ibid). The biggest concern is then, the “transitionality of 
victims”, most especially those abducted from their homes and subjected 
to weird practices for a long time. They form characters very difficult to 
dispense with, once their side is vanquished. The dominant challenge is 
how post-bush transitionality can be managed in a new political and civil 
dispensation overseen by the state. During the Nazi trials it was argued 
that rule of law should not mean breaking away completely from the Nazi 
justice systems. Some thinkers argued that some Nazi laws, no matter how 
immoral they might have been, should have been allowed to retain some 
legal force. What was needed in this context was simply a reinterpretation 
of those laws. Of course, the question of laws, whose normative values are 
incompatible with rule of law, makes us ponder too long on what forms of 
justice should prevail during re-integration, resettlement, and other transi-
tional processes.
Transition and Discourses of Return
 There is need to re-examine the notion of return in the context of transi-
tion in post-war communities. “Return”, as used in post-war discourses of 
settlement and restoration excludes much more than it includes. In many 
cases, after the guns have gone silent government facilitate survivors to re-
turn to homes from which they had been displaced. In the case of north-
ern Uganda, more than one million people displaced in the Acholi, Lango, 
and some parts of Teso region in eastern Uganda were finally “returned” 
from 2005 to 2006.11 People return from camps, exile, asylum, forced mi-
gration, and so forth12. Return is also known as resettlement or sometimes 
repatriation. Major facilitators of “return” and “resettlement” projects are 
national governments, humanitarian agencies, and non-governmental or-
ganizations.13 Return is conceptually intertwined with justice. It is a stage 
in the process of transition that conjectures a number of interpretations. In 
its conventional sense, it means that somebody or a group of persons are 
leaving an abode of displacement, exile, or asylum to get back to a place 
11 “Victims’ Perceptions of Accountability, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Northern 
Uganda”, Office of the United Nations’ High Commission for Human Rights, 4-35.
12 Van, Hear, Nicholas “From ‘Durable Solutions’ to ‘Transnational Relations’: Home and Exile 
among Refugee Diasporas”, Center for Development Research, CDR Working Paper, 02.9, July 
2002, p. 2.
13 “Victims’ Perception of Accountability, Reconciliation and transitional Justice”, 4-35.
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they used to know as home. Return should include homecoming that en-
tails comprehensive processes of indemnification—meaning that as people 
go back they are not awed by loss and deprivation.
Critical, is how survivors, refugees, or formerly displaced people 
should return, taking into account the vital economies of return and the 
reform that it requires in transitional period. Return should be conceptual-
ized as part of transitional process synonymous with justice to “returned” 
communities. In transitional period, return should mean more than going 
back home. In current discourses, there are a number of omissions and 
assumptions that obviate its logic. You do not return to life those who died 
in displaced camps or in exile. You can only return their remains. You do 
not return time wasted, cultures impaired, and opportunities lost in the 
period of war. You can only repair the wreckage of time and of culture 
by mitigating poverty, disease, and cultural degeneration. You can revamp 
things that have been lost but you cannot do it with the exactitude that the 
concept of “return” presupposes. There is need to filter specific dossiers 
in the concept of return. For instance, what are those things that are trans-
planted from host communities, by returnees, yet are alien to the history of 
returned communities? To understand fully the concept of return it is nec-
essary to make a historical tour of pre-war times, to take stock of material, 
immaterial, spiritual, and other vital economies of that community. Fur-
ther more, it is crucial to examine the cultural influences of host-homes, 
to see what returning communities are tempted to take back with, to see 
whether taking back such packages tantamount to a just “return”. In the 
case of displaced camps in northern Uganda, there are things learnt in pro-
tected villages (host communities) that returning people should unlearn in 
order to create a just return.
Nicholas Van Hear (2002) has sighted cases of refugee diasporas that 
followed upheavals in Afghanistan, Palestine and Srilanka since the 1970s. 
Following fighting between the Muhajedin and the Kabul regime support-
ed by the then Soviet Union, there were massive exodus of refugees to the 
neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Iran. The Soviet backed regime 
collapsed in 1992 paving way to the Taliban regime that sprang from the ref-
ugee population in Pakistan from 1996 to 2001. A good number of Afghans 
returned, but up to 2.5 million remained in Iran and Pakistan until the over-
throw of the Taliban. Van Hear has indicated that in displacement, asylum 
and exile, there are often transnational relations created. Such relations 
explain connections between the homeland (place of origin), the neigh-
bouring country (country of first asylum), and countries of asylum further 
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afield (ibid, 4). In these connections there are bound to be movements of 
money and information. Van Hear adds that displaced camps have no 
rigidly tight boundaries. There are small movements of people between 
the host country, first asylum country, and asylum countries further afield 
(ibid). Van Hear’s case explicates the expanded discourses of return. When 
refugees repatriate money, they do not send the labour and skills they used 
for making such monies. When they return physically they take with them 
such skills. Such transfers are however, constructed and padded by cultural 
standards of the host country. In that case returnees come back with new 
mindsets and worldviews that present culture shocks or innovations. Both 
scenarios impacts transition in different ways. Culture shock refers to man-
nerisms that are socially repugnant to home norms. Similarly, Dolan Chris 
(2009) considered “protected villages” in northern Uganda as humiliation, 
his critique focusing on the moral consequences of parents sharing dingy 
rooms with their children in displaced people’s camps. The assumption 
is that a proper return paradigm de-assimilates unwanted learnt practices 
from host communities, practices that undermine the cherished values of 
returning communities.
When we consider “return” we also have to be mindful of security of 
the returning communities. The case of northern Uganda is a tricky affair, 
considering the fact that LRA rebels planted landmines in trading centers, 
villages, along the roads, in schools, markets and so forth. How do you re-
turn people to villages riddled with land mines? From as early as 1995, sev-
eral people were being blown off with different types of land mines.14 Land 
mines have killed people in Tugu, Paibona, Awach, and several places in 
Kitgum, Pader, and Gulu (ibid.). Return would comprehensively integrate 
the teaching of communities to safeguard themselves against the dangers 
of land mines.
“Return” as part of transition is “just” when returnees are equipped 
with necessary political, civic, and military education to survive in a re-
turned community that is not yet safe. Return embraces transitional justice 
if victims of land mines and other forms of violence are helped to overcome 
disabilities by giving them opportunities of corrective surgery. In February 
22nd 2015, Adina Foundation Uganda, a local NGO in Lira organized a “Run 
to Walk” marathon in which participants, civil societies, corporate bodies, 
and business communities contributed money to enable children disabled 
by war, accidents, and congenital defects, to “walk again” in order to unlock 
their potentials. Adina marathon was not supported by the central govern-
14 The New Vision 3rd October 1995, p. 13.
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ment despite the wide publicity that was made. It would be in the good 
interest of government to politically enhance such efforts if children lost 
their limbs because they were not duly protected.
Stories of land mine victims also help us to understand how war ends. 
For so many years after cessation of hostility, landmines killed and disa-
bled many people. The Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) advocated 
against the manufacture and sale of land mines, but they did not mobilize 
the international community in raising funds for land mine victims. Con-
ventional war may end, but things like landmines silently perpetuate war. 
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) land 
mines are cheap to buy but expensive to remove and will remain long after 
the war has ended”.15 Countries like Cambodia and Afghanistan that expe-
rienced war several years ago are still battling the problems of land mines 
(ibid). A critical dilemma is how to help a person without legs to transit 
to peace and prosperity, a litany commonly sung by post-conflict govern-
ments. Such a person, if not compensated or rehabilitated continues to live 
with war within him. In the words of Antanasio Ocan, a land mine victim 
“ I find no words to explain it. I cannot continue with my job since my legs 
are missing” How do you render justice to such a person in an era of transi-
tion? To such a person, the fact that the guns have gone silent would mean 
that the war has ended. His transition includes reforms that rebuild him 
into a survivor of war, unafraid of uncertainty.
As a complex phenomenon, is it return to homes or return to normal-
cy? And what is normalcy? There were abducted children forced to batter 
other abducted people.16 Children abducted from Lamola and Acholibur 
on August 22 1995 testified that they were made to batter thirty captives, 
those who were accused by rebels of attempting to escape. In most of their 
raids, rebels burnt houses, looted livestock, destroyed granaries, looted 
foodstuffs, and destroyed household property.17 In Lango and Teso regions 
(heavily affected by the LRA war) transitional focus has emphasized restock-
ing. Restocking, which is being done as a way of replenishing the shattered 
economy of survivors has challenges. In the first place the policy assumes 
that the people of northern Uganda were exclusively cattle keepers. But 
northern Uganda has been a mixed economy in which majority of people 
also practiced small-scale commercial agriculture. Return by supplying ox 
ploughs did not go far because not every part of northern Uganda used ox 
15 The New Vision, Wednesday March 22 1995.p. 19
16 The New Vision 18th October 1995, p. 28
17 The New Vision 23rd October 1995, pp. 1-2
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ploughs for cultivation. The houses and vehicles burnt or destroyed have 
not been compensated. Lopsided return policies undermine transition 
from war to peace, and economic recovery. It also undermines justice, if 
justice is to be understood as giving back to people what was taken away 
from them.
Evans and Reid (2014) highlight the notion of resilience in the dis-
courses of return, something they call an “ideal” for survivors. “Resilience”, 
they say, is now being highly articulated by liberal agencies and institutions 
as “the fundamental property that peoples and individuals worldwide must 
possess in order to demonstrate their capabilities to live with danger”. Be-
cause post-war transitional processes produce political subjectivities in 
different magnitudes, aid agencies, local actors, and state agencies often 
devote their resources toward equipping survivors for a life beyond the 
horrors of war. Resilience, the authors say, refers to “ability to avoid suffer-
ing significant adverse effects” of a hostile or devastating experience (my 
modification). In other words resilience is how victims survive in a state of 
adversity. Resilience is not a political claim that necessitates an affirmative 
“survivability instinct” that does not place emphasis on the political (ibid 
6). Instead resilience thrives on liberalism, which unfortunately also pro-
duces its own violence. Evans and Reid are not certain on how a survivor 
equipped with tools of resilience survives violence unleashed by its own 
liberal system. Their discussion of resilience as a transitional requirement 
for returnees helps us to understand who a survivor is, or how a survivor is 
different from a victim.
First, in their claim, “survivability” is presented as a form of poten-
tial that enables the experiencer of adversity to live beyond “contemporary 
limits of their existence” (ibid, 29). That potential is partially explained to 
mean the “action” that a survivor puts toward regenerating himself. In oth-
er words, a survivor is a person whose mechanics of memory of adversity 
(through retrospection, memoirs, commemoration and other forms of re-
membrance), translate into an innovation aimed at transforming his live-
lihood. A survivor is in that context not a dormant recipient of donations, 
alms, handouts and the like. It is a survivor’s resilience that enhances his 
ability to mitigate adversities. A survivor is that person with a proven ca-
pacity to adapt and thrive in the face of suffering (ibid 32). He is not just a 
person who has escaped death in war, violence, or any hazardous condi-
tion of life. He does not simply survive death in a war situation and then 
fail to survive trauma, deprivations, and other secondary effects of war. He 
generates inspiration that enables him to live beyond turbulent experienc-
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es during and after war. He must survive several things, including the spirit, 
will power and creative ability to reproduce the life decimated by adversity. 
He carries into a post-war period learnt lessons, skills, dexterity, and vir-
tuosity that enhance personal and community livelihoods. A survivor is a 
participant in the collective work of “re-membering” (ibid 7, Ngugi, 1989).
In Matigari (1987), Ngugi wa Thiongo’ presents the heroic Matigari 
returning with his gun and sword, which he secretly buries in a bush, be-
fore beginning on his journey to look for truth and justice (Ngugi, 1987:4). 
Survivability, in that context, has a tripartite face: return, retention, and 
forgetting. There are things that a survivor retains and there are things that 
he should forget. Matigari buries his gun and sword, yet he still has the will 
to fight in search for truth and justice. In that beautiful novel, Matigari says, 
“It’s good that I have now laid down my arms…I have now girded myself 
with a belt of peace. I shall go back to my house and rebuild my home”. Af-
ter saying this, “He crossed the river and came out of the forest”.18 A survi-
vor returns home, but with something he has retained to facilitate a process 
of regeneration or resettlement. He must indeed come out of the forest 
of violence, hatred, trauma and all the putridness of war. A victim does 
not possess those attributes. He is almost irreversibly incapacitated social-
ly, morally, and mentally and should benefit from efforts of survivors and 
other aid actors. Patients of nodding disease syndrome in northern Ugan-
da are typical examples of victims. As Hillary Onek, the then Minister for 
Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees stated, daycare centers should 
be set for children with nodding diseases to enable their parents engage in 
income generating activities.19 Onek said that the syndrome is complex; be-
cause parents must trail the children everywhere they go because many of 
them, left unguarded, are known to have drowned in rivers. There are over 
3000 child victims of nodding disease in the northern districts of Pader, 
Agago, Lamwoo and Kitgum (ibid.). Nodding disease children can however 
be turned into survivors if critical research is done to battle this endemic in 
northern Uganda. The aid should go beyond the daycare center and tones 
of food that the Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA) donated for 
the nodding disease victims. Such aid is never transitory. At best it is pal-
liative. The disease that cause multiple injuries (head nodding and con-
vulsions), also traumatize families of victims. Minister Onek surprisingly 
said that Uganda’s ministry of health had not budgeted any funds towards 
containing the disease (ibid). If these children must become survivors of 
18 See Matigari (1987), p. 5
19 New Vision, Monday May 11 2015, “Onek wants Daycare for Nodding patients”, p. 15.
MISR WP 26 Ocen.indd   14 15/10/2015   09:17
JUSTICE AND PEACE AFTER WAR: 
CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE DISCOURSES OF TRANSITION AND REFORM IN POST-WAR SOCIETIES
war, they must come out of their physical and mental afflictions, and be 
able to at least partially live on their own, rather than depend totally on 
their parents. They must develop resilience worthy of a true survivor.
That understanding of a survivor would contrast sharply with how 
Billie O’Kadameri The New Vision correspondent on the northern Uganda 
war in the mid 1990s looked at a survivor. O’Kadameri considered a sur-
vivor in a rather limited sense, as someone who has escaped death or sur-
vived a violent entrapment.20 Lt. Colonel Otii Lagony reportedly command-
ed Attiak massacre on 20th April 1995. The final death tolls stood at 209, 159 
of these were from Attiak. The rebels paraded their captives that included 
men, women, and children up to the confluence of River Ayugi and River 
Awic. Separating pregnant women, children below ten years of age, and 
breastfeeding women, the rebels sprayed bullets on the others, killing over 
200 people. Those spared were ordered to clap their hands in apprecia-
tion to what the rebels had done. Terrified and dumbfounded, some of the 
children who had seen their parents killed clapped their hands to avoid 
the rebels’ wrath. Ten kilometers away 65 people were killed in a similar 
manner. Sixteen homeguards, one policeman, forty-one students, and one 
police administrator were also killed on this same day. The rebels burnt 210 
grass thatched houses, 22 commercial premises, one office block, a lorry 
belonging to Middle North Tobacco Cooperative Union and set ablaze a 
pick up belonging to a produce buyer (ibid). O’Kadameri would look at the 
spared pregnant women, breastfeeding mothers, and those children below 
ten years of age as survivors in the sense that they were spared death on 
that fateful day. In other words, an escapee in the heat of the moment fits 
into O’Kadameri’s definition of a survivor. But a survivor in transitional 
context should not simply be an escapee from a fatal situation. The chil-
dren who saw their parents killed, the pregnant and breastfeeding women 
who witnessed their husbands killed, who knew that henceforth the chil-
dren they are carrying and those they were yet to bear would be orphans 
should be able to survive the traumas of the scene long after the incident.
It is not advisable for scholars and policy makers on post-war tran-
sition to analyze survivors as a generalized category. Interventions to im-
prove survivors’ livelihoods should be considered differently when han-
dling transitional processes. To expound on this point, I unpack the notion 
of survivability as used by Evans and Reid. First, “survivability” depends 
on political liberalism. It thrives on the input that the war living dispenses 
in memory of the war dead. Such potential, equally thrives in a certain 
20 Sunday Vision, Sunday April 30th 1995. See also The New Vision, Saturday Feb. 4th 1995, p. 10.
MISR WP 26 Ocen.indd   15 15/10/2015   09:17
political and social landscape. Transitional mechanisms should be able to 
provide enabling conditions that make it possible for human potentials to 
thrive—such as opening up roads, markets, social infrastructures and the 
like. Survivors cannot achieve some of these on their own. In northern 
Uganda, majority of people live as victims and not survivors. Their personal 
and collective narratives are sad stories of neglect, deprivation, pessimism, 
and a yearning for what government can do to better their living condi-
tions. Survivability is featuring in situations and places where non-govern-
mental organizations have mobilized communities into development and 
rehabilitation activities.
That notwithstanding, I went to a village near Gulgoi in Abia and 
found that local boys and girls, without external funding, have started a lo-
cal brick industry at the clay mines of Gulgoi. Gulgoi had in the past been 
the capital of pottery and other clay arts in Lango subregion. It was also 
in Gulgoi that Okot Odiambo, one of the LRA’s most notorious command-
ers indicted by the ICC camped with his fighters for several months and 
launched at least three rounds of massacres in 2004.21 In addition to a flour-
ishing pottery, brickwork and sand mining have now sprung up in Gulgoi. 
Evans and Reid have said that survivability and resilience are closely as-
sociated with ecology. Transitional reform should enhance protection of 
eco-systems that are threatened with decimation due to a great upsurge of 
Capital in former war zones. Evans and Reid use the term “anthroposcene” 
to refer to “a distinct geological epoch that is defined by the scale of human 
activity” (ibid 3). A workable justice and reform is the one that will allow 
survivors to exploit these resources as a way of recuperating from the hor-
rific and destructive consequences of war. There is a worrying reality in 
many of the post-war communities I have visited, particularly in Barlonyo, 
Abia, and Otuke where local capitalists and entrepreneurs invest colossal 
finances to exploit resources like sand and stone quarries, charcoal burn-
ing, and gems extraction. These are resources, which survivors could ex-
ploit toward their much-needed recovery. In a transitional period, by-laws 
and other regulatory systems that protect ecological heritage of surviving 
communities could create swift recovery. It is on account of this that liber-
alism does not offer enhancing space for surviving communities. Market 
liberalism ensures that survivors are outcompeted by capitalists and entre-
preneurs that maraud formerly war ravaged areas to exploit local resources 
and heritage. As Evans and Reid observe, liberalism should rather aim at 
21 Interview: Singers of Abwoc Yie Kec Group whose songs depict virulent acts of Okot 
Odhiambo. They also sing songs of struggle against hostile conditions of war.
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solving and preventing manifestation of dangers and threats to the security 
of surviving communities. Legal instruments should offset threats against 
their economic and cultural revival.
In Abia, I observed that a local art and cultural troupe—Abwoc Yie Kec22 
has been variously engaged by NGOs, state agencies, local governments in 
the production of songs, drama, dance and other cultural interventions. At 
commemorations, anniversaries, festivals, parties, and other ceremonies 
they are called to perform. There is not much that this group gains from 
their wonderful performances, even when they sometimes move hundreds 
of miles to perform. It is in this area that interventions to protect surviv-
ing communities from different forms of exploitation and usurpation are 
needed. Groups like Abwoc Yie Kec should be equipped with capacities that 
enable them demand worthy professional fees for their performances. An 
impotent man is bitter (abwoc yie kec) if post-war transitional processes take 
unfair advantage of his economic, political, and social impotencies by ex-
ploiting his talents, taking advantage of his turbulent history and exploiting 
his voicelessness. Measures should be taken to minimize the injustices of 
market liberalism that does not protect survivors in marginal communities.
Sen Amartya (1999), who conceptualizes development, as freedom 
would contradict the above argument. The role of markets, according to 
Amartya, is central in development process (Amartya, 1999: 6). Significant, 
is the amount of market freedom necessary in transitional communities. 
As Robert Bates (1981) argues, intervention in markets by powerful agen-
cies should not harm the interests of small entrepreneurs (Bates, 1981: 81). 
Sheltering of domestic industries from aggressive competition would be 
the role of the state (ibid). Rural dwellers’ capacities to exploit available 
alternatives should be enhanced to facilitate recovery, and this is one way 
of appreciating transitional justice in transitional societies.
Although Amartya has argued that free market mechanism enhances 
economic growth, such freedom could be to the detriment of survivors’ 
struggle to revitalize their plundered economies if it is not regulated. Adam 
Smith was one of the earlier proponents of freedom of exchange as basic 
to the liberties of people. But such, is not the type of freedoms that survi-
vors of war can benefit from. Survivors of war need protectionist measures 
to safeguard their fragile economies recuperating from the detriments of 
war. Free, unregulated markets in this context would only contribute to 
22 Abwoc Yie Kec is a Luo expression, which means, “an impotent man is bitter/angry. It is a local 
okeme (thumb piano) music and dance troupe started in the early 80s. Today they think about 
issues of violence, suffering, recovery, hope. Some of the social hazards that their songs depict 
can be symbolized by the metaphor of impotence.
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new wars between survivors and others if free market monopolizes alloca-
tion of resources. How market is understood in transitional justice is what 
I emphasize. Karl Marx said that in replicating the history of advanced 
capitalist Europe, the less developed does so under hasher and retrograde 
conditions.23 If market is an economic space in which people buy and sell 
goods and services, then it is not only freedom which is a core value of 
market mechanism, but also fairness. Market liberalism, as Serequeberhan 
says, is the language of the more developed, not the less developed (ibid). 
In other words, freedom is the language of industrial development. In this 
sense, no capitalist mode of production is fair in survivors’ communities. 
To a large extent, war has its own principles of economics and modes of 
distribution. War is a multidirectional service industry in which different 
categories offer or even sell services that directly or indirectly contribute to 
war efforts—the media, humanitarian agencies, spiritual bodies, producers, 
consumers all have stakes in war. Absolute freedom in the allocation of 
resources would only benefit capital, not survivors.
Rhetoric of “Numbers” and “Words”
At Barlonyo mass grave in Lira, there is a plaque laminated on the monu-
ment with the following inscription “This memorial stone was laid by H.E 
President Yoweri Museveni in Memory of the 121 innocent civilians killed 
by LRA terrorists on 21st February 2004”. This memorial plague is the first 
point of attraction to tens of visitors who daily throng Barlonyo. Two things 
that electrify the attention of any visitor are the number “121” and the word 
“terrorists” on the memorial tablet. The visitor then scans the prominence 
of the oval-shaped mass grave that looks like a concrete surface made to start 
foundation of a building. He becomes an arithmetician of a type, drawing 
the parallelism between the sprawling mass grave and the figure 121. The 
mass grave is so massive that it is obviously an understatement to claim 
that only 121 people are buried there. Names of the dead are not indicated. 
But the mass grave-guides often help visitors to solve this riddle when they 
say that bodies were exhumed, recounted and found to be 301 instead of 
121.24 They also say that in their “private” records, they have all names of the 
dead. Survivors insist that the UPDF, who “supervised” the burial of victims 
a day after the massacres, doctored the number of deaths.25 Government 
23 See Serequeberhan, Tsenay. 2007, p. 108
24 Interviews: custodians and guides of Barlonyo Mass Memorial.
25 A brigadier in the UPDF “supervised” the burial, which was so swiftly done that the relatives 
of victims were not allowed to view their loved ones or perform any traditional ritual of burial 
on that day
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pin-pointedly named perpetrators of the massacres, “terrorists”, and not 
“rebels”. Such nomenclatures have rhetorical implications in the politics 
and poetics of transitional reforms.
 Kenneth Burke (1969) has observed that rhetoric has “motives” 
and “actions” that build different identifications in a work (Burke 1969: 
36). Although Burke’s discourse focuses on literary text, we are interested 
in how “rhetoric” and “motive” traverse the domain of material arts like 
monuments. Rhetorical motive, as Burke says, determines whether an ob-
ject is good or bad. In other words it establishes how an object is put to use 
(ibid, 31). Burke has admitted that objects can become political, and this is 
shown by the numerical figure “121” and the word “terrorist” inscribed on 
the memorial tablet. Survivors have come to realize that figure 121 grossly 
misrepresents their memory of Barlonyo massacre. One survivor says, “one 
day people will wake up to find that we have demolished this structure. We 
want this plate removed and replaced with the correct number. We also 
want the names of the dead written here just like it is in Lukodi and other 
places”. The number “121” and the word “terrorist” are rhetorical referents. 
First, the figure 121 determined by officers of the UPDF conflicts with what 
survivors say. Since it was the duty of the UPDF to protect inhabitants of 
Barlonyo camp, high numbers would sing loud the irresponsibility of the 
army. In any case, it was the UPDF that drove people to go into the camp 
with a promise of protection.26 As it is the function of rhetoric to persuade 
audiences, the number 121 is meant to lessen the effect of the tragedy of 
Barlonyo, which could complicate international credibility of the Ugandan 
government if the numbers were higher. Higher numbers would generate 
debates about the nomenclatures of the war in northern Uganda, whether 
to classify it as genocide, disaster, tragedy, and the like.27 Either way, this 
would have political and diplomatic implications for the Ugandan govern-
ment. Just as any rhetoric has a speaker, the rhetorician of the memorial 
tablet of Barlonyo has one, the Ugandan state.
The word “terrorist” on the memorial plaque at Barlonyo justified the 
Ugandan government’s opposition to dialogue and negotiations with the 
LRA. President Museveni consistently opposed Acholi religious leaders for 
26 See Atkinson, Ronald. 2010. The Roots of Ethnicity, Origins of the Acholi, Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, pp. 295, 297. Also see Branch, Adam 2011, pp. 71-9
27 Atkinson, Ronald, 2010 quotes Jan Egeland to have described the northern Uganda war, 
particularly conditions in the camps as “the biggest neglected humanitarian emergency 
in the world”. In Acholi region more than 90 percent of the displaced population lived in 
extremely squalid conditions. In the neighbouring areas of Lango and Teso where the war 
spread and reached peak conditions in 2004, nearly one million people displaced faced 
humanitarian disaster. For detail, see Atkinson Ronald, 2010, p. 304.
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their insistence on dialogue with LRA insurgents.28 If the LRA were referred 
to as “rebels” it would call for multifaceted approaches in the search for 
peace in northern Uganda, including round table discussions. Although 
referring to the LRA as terrorists justified the use of military option while 
undermining options of dialogue29, in the post-war transitional period, it 
would also have other implications. First, it would undermine the inter-
national credibility that the LRA was bound to create abroad.30 It is also 
debatable whether survivors or returnees of terrorist violence should be 
treated the same way survivors of rebels’ violence are. In post-war northern 
Uganda, the two are being taken as one and the same category. In tran-
sitional period, survivors and returnees of a rebels’ violence demand po-
litical redress because rebels are militants that voice political discontent 
through war. Rebels deploy both military and political modes of resistance. 
Terrorists may have a political agenda, but they articulate it through crude, 
anti human display of violence and horror. They target unarmed, vulnera-
ble categories in what is normally seen as proxy wars intended to discredit, 
demoralize, or wreck down political, economic and social institutions.
Michael Walzer (1977) used the word terrorism to describe revolu-
tionary violence. There is outright ambiguity. Either Walzer is assuming 
that revolutionizing a system is achievable through exclusive violence, or 
he is portraying the myopic ideology of terrorist violence, which takes it 
for granted that the instrument of violence is sufficient to cause revolution-
ary change. Revolutionizing a system requires approaches of war, dialogue, 
concessions, truce, and so forth. But while synthesizing the meaning of 
terrorism, Watzer explains that terrorists aim at destroying the moral of a 
nation, or a class, to undercut its solidarity using the technique of random 
murder (ibid, 197). Terrorists, Watzer adds, instill fear by killing people 
identified with specific class, regime, party, or a policy (ibid). An interest-
ing dimension he illuminates is that terrorism is a way of avoiding engage-
ment with the enemy army, an approach that seemed to have been used 
28 Daily Monitor, January 22 1997, p. 24.
29 Ronald Atkinson has elaborated on the tensions that characterized the peace process in 
Juba between the LRA and Ugandan Government in South Sudan from 2006-8. The Juba 
Peace talks staggered severally despite being boosted by the signing of Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement between the SPLM and Khartoum Government, and the roles played by 
international statesmen like Joachim Chisano of Mozambique. The Ugandan Government 
appeared uninterested because this would be a dialogue with terrorists and bandits. Whereas 
the Ugandan government exuded lukewarm attitude to it, the peace process was extoled 
by Acholi religious and cultural leaders, NGOs and civil society organizations. Government, 
looking at the LRA as terrorists did not consider options of dialogue worthwhile. For detail, 
see Atkinson, Ronald, 2010, pp. 308-21.
30 Daily Monitor, January 22, 1997, p. 24.
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by the LRA. Going by what Watzer says, winning war against terrorism is 
a struggle that is hard to realize. In the same way it is also very difficult 
for terrorist to win wars. They simply succeed in “breaking the hearts of 
subjects” (ibid 198). The ending of a war fought by rebel movements may 
take long, but is easy to anticipate or predict when approached political-
ly. Rebels engage in formal wars, while terrorists engage in unpredictable 
violence in terms of time and location. Rebels have something to table for 
redress after a truce, while terrorists present demands and ultimatums as 
agenda for concessions. Be that as it may, there must be some room for 
discussing demands and ultimatums. It is a very tall order to assume that 
those who do not engage in conventional wars can be defeated militarily. 
Terrorists’’ demands are often political, but in these political grievances, 
often there are social and economic issues at play.
In northern Uganda, redress, as focal point for intervention or dia-
logue includes grievances related to marginalization, representation, social 
imbalances, and infrastructural development (Atkinson 2010: 291, 331). In 
these areas, the government of President Museveni has done relatively well. 
The Peace, Recovery, and Development Program (PRDP) was launched in 
October 2007, followed by Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) I 
& II, National Agricultural Advisory and Development Services (NAADS), 
and Now Operation Wealth Creation being overseen by UPDF officers de-
ployed at sub counties. New roads from Gulu, via Attiak (the center of LRA 
massacre) to Nimule and South Sudan have been tarmacked. There is an-
other road construction project underway, covering the road from Gulu, 
Acholibur, Mucwini, and to South Sudan. War has created new opportuni-
ties of trade and partnership with the government of Southern Sudan and 
the larger Eastern Africa31. But in the transitional period, northern Uganda 
needs more than tangible physical and material infrastructures. The LRA’s 
claim that people of the north were, or are marginalized, cannot be taken 
as politically relevant if the state rhetoric is that, the group was a bunch of 
terrorists. Historical errors of judgment must be corrected if transitional 
justice must suffice. Ronald Atkinson32 has indicated that when President 
Museveni used the word “terrorists” to refer to the LRA, he was not exclu-
sively talking about the innocent civilians killed in the north. He was in-
sinuating the over 800,000 people which he claimed were killed by Milton 
Obote’s Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) in the bushes of Luwero 
31 There is a mega rail construction project underway, covering Uganda, Kenya, South Sudan, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
32 Atkinson, Ronald, 2010, p. 288.
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Triangle. This hateful history accounts for why Museveni used words like 
“bandits”, “primitive”, “ignorant” to refer to the LRA as symbolic remnants 
of a terrorist army that plundered Luwero. Most governments dismiss ter-
rorists as groups that cannot table reform agenda in the post-war period. 
The unanswered question is what modus operandi governments can use 
to discuss political reform issues with groups deemed to be terrorists. Yet 
transitional reforms work best if they are approached politically through 
discussions that lead to legislation of reform.
The rhetoric of terrorism as nomenclature of representing activities of 
armed insurgents in northern Uganda would not facilitate return of peace 
if acts of the LRA duplicated terrorists’ activities. The ARLPI and other civ-
il society organizations in northern Uganda have insisted that the people 
killed in Barlonyo, Attiak, Lukodi, and elsewhere should be accounted for 
by examining the role played by both the LRA and the UPDF (Rodriquez 
2009, Branch 2011, Atkinson 2010). Criticizing the approach adopted by 
Luis Moreno Ocampo, the then ICC Prosecutor, leaders argued that both 
the LRA and the UPDF should account for the mass killings. Looking at the 
LRA alone as terrorists would exonerate the dark side of the UPDF. Adam 
Branch observed that the rhetoric of terrorism has made it easy for Pres-
ident Museveni to tie war against the LRA to US interests in the region by 
“serving as a conduit to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), inter-
preting war against the LRA as war on terror.33 According to Branch, this 
enabled Museveni not only to expand his military budget, but also obtain 
international funding and supply of military logistics from the US govern-
ment (Branch 2011: 79). The UPDF military presence has ever since multi-
plied in South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Somalia. The rhetoric 
of war against terror and the political, diplomatic, and economic advan-
tages it created enabled the state to exploit to its advantage, situations of 
war in northern Uganda. President, Museveni was able to use this war to 
unilaterally control the defense budget and expand, much to the dismay of 
donor communities (ibid).
While using rhetoric of word to understand the nature of LRA war 
in northern Uganda, its modes of classification comes into perspective. In 
Lukodi village, survivors dispute on the naming and classification of this 
war. Some viewed the war as having been between the LRA rebels and ”En-
emy Government”.34 The label “enemy government” explained civilians’ 
33 Also see Atkinson, Ronald, 2010, p. 301
34 Interviewed: survivors (names withheld) used that referent to show their displeasure at the 
horrid conditions of the protected villages in Lira and Amuru.
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protestation of forced encampment, which Ronald Atkinson says, created 
“structural violence” that must have killed more people than LRA bullets or 
even those in Darfur.35 Some government bureaucrats saw the war as “in-
tra-civil” conflict in which the Acholi were killing one another, and extend-
ing this violence to their neighbours, the Langi and Iteso. Others refused to 
believe that the LRA was fighting the government of Uganda.36 Why would 
Kony attack and kill them if indeed he was fighting the government of 
Uganda? What would Museveni lose if the LRA killed all of them? Such 
voices accused the NRM government of the sin of omission, insinuating that 
the LRA was a state sanctioned rogue army perpetuating organized vendetta 
to kill the people of northern Uganda for committing atrocities in Luwero 
Triangle. Ronald Atkinson has however, observed that the rebels’ rationale 
for killing civilians was to internationally discredit the government for fail-
ing to discharge its sovereign functions.
Terrorism as statist reference to insurgents, has impact on how former 
child soldiers are regarded in returned communities. Reception centers 
like Sponsoring Children Uganda, World Vision, and Child’s Voice Inter-
national received thousands of children who returned from the bush. But 
the manner in which most returned communities received them, showed 
that the state’s reference to such children as terrorists, shaped the hate at-
titude of the local people against former child soldiers. Receiving commu-
nities took them as terrorists whose inhuman bush war culture could not 
have been tamed in only a couple of months.
In a post-war drama staged in northern Uganda by United Troupers 
Theatre Group, funded by Sponsoring Children Uganda in Lira, Monica 
Adero the central character returns home after three years in LRA captiv-
ity and gets extremely hostile reception from her own community. She is 
browbeaten, insulted, and ostracized by her own people. In fact, people re-
fer to her as a terrorist. It is clear that such opinions are politically shaped 
by what people read about rebels in newspapers, in speeches delivered by 
politicians and state functionaries when they address public functions. In 
transitional logic, such referents do not dispense justice. It is injustice for 
state media and public spaces to shape community hostility to returning 
children who have not been given a fair hearing in the form of truth telling, 
public hearing, and other mechanisms of accountability. Monica Adero’s 
case is replicated by Dominic Ongwen’s case before the ICC. Dominic Ong-
35 Atkinson, Ronald. 2010, pp 304-5.
36 Opinions expressed among many survivors of Barlonyo and Abia massacre sites in Lira 
district, November 2014
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wen was allegedly abducted on his way to school when he was fourteen 
years. In the newspapers he is referred to as villain and victim. His trial 
promises twisting controversies in the meaning of justice.37 By the time he 
was abducted at 14 while on his way to school, his name was Denis Erem38. 
The LRA gave him the bush name of Dominic Ongwen. When we think of 
Denis Erem we remember innocence, victimhood and vulnerability. On 
the other hand when we think of Dominic Ongwen, we remember abduc-
tions, rape, and other crimes against humanity. When the ICC puts him to 
trial at The Hague, will they try him as Denis Erem, or Dominic Ongw-
en? What impacts will such a trial have on transitional processes at home 
(northern Uganda)?
Relating Darfur to northern Uganda— 
rhetoric and politics of numbers.
Mahmmod Mamdani’s views on the conflict of Darfur show how numbers 
shape opinions in the discourses of intervention. In the conflict of Darfur 
(2003-2007), he shows how the international media played about with the 
rhetoric and politics of numbers in that crisis. Mortality level in Darfur, 
which was first put at 50,000, was later revised to 70,000 after protests from 
civil societies and human rights agencies. Mamdani shows that even the 
new figure of 70,000 remained far below the actual numbers of death in 
Darfur. Death statistics are shown as very crucial in both the inter war and 
post-war developments because they have political and diplomatic impli-
cations. Like in northern Uganda, Mamdani is concerned with who does 
the death ranking. Drawing from his view, numerical ranking of death in 
places like Rwanda (800,000), Bosnia (250,000), Kosovo (12000), which was 
done by the International Rescue Committee (ICC), dictated international 
responses to those conflicts in different ways. In this context, governments, 
in whose territories such wars occur would want to control information 
and statistics of deaths. A contentious area that Mamdani highlights is the 
discrepancy between the primary and secondary causes of death in war 
situations. The figure 121 at Barlonyo and another figure 65 at Lukodi in 
northern Uganda—were these deaths arising from direct acts of violence 
on the days of massacre or they also included secondary effects of death? 
Mamdani has unequivocally argued that there is significant relationship 
37 For similar testimonies from formerly abducted children who were forced to become 
wives to rebel commanders, see “Victims’ Perceptions of Accountability, Reconciliation 
and transitional Justice in Northern Uganda”, Office of the United Nations High commission for 
Human Rights, 9-11
38 Interviews: Ongwen’s cousins in Minakullu where he spent part of his early childhood
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between war and other causes of human mortality.39 In computing figures 
of death, statisticians should work out modalities of including deaths aris-
ing from indirect effects of war. Numbers such as 121 in Barlonyo, 203 in 
Attiak, and 65 in Lukodi revealed shocking paucity of knowledge about 
how war kills. The figures represent only dead bodies found on the scenes 
of massacre. The figures do not consider those who fled and perished in 
the bushes, or those who died of war effects, a long time after the fateful 
events. These figures also do not consider those that must have developed 
fatal complications arising from war trauma. The figures do not consider 
cases such as that of an ill fated child who was found clung on her dead 
mother, trying unsuccessfully to suckle lifeless breasts.40
 In transitional period it is important that exact numbers of survi-
vors and victims are established if things like compensation, reparation, 
restoration are to be scrupulously implemented. Numbers influence plan-
ning and dispensation of recovery aid to help post-war societies. Deliberate 
reduction of mortality figures is false remembering that buries memories 
of people unrepresented in the memorial statistics. Although Mamdani has 
cautioned that genocide is determined by “intent”, much less by numbers, 
numerical statistics are important because they enable us to investigate 
that “intent”. In the case of northern Uganda, the LRA explicitly stated their 
intention as being to “wipe out the Acholi population and replace it with 
a new Acholi constituted by children born in the bush” (Branch 2011: 71). 
Yet, genocide was far from being declared in northern Uganda. Mamdani’s 
argument, that “intent” determines genocide, ignores “hidden intent” of-
ten insulated in apparent motives. In other words, this view assumes that 
“intent” to commit genocide is straightforward and evidently discernible. 
“Hidden intent” could be traced in protected villages in northern Uganda 
and concentration camps in South Africa in the violence that has been 
remembered by the Voutmonuments (Donald 2009, Branch, 2011, Stanley 
2006). In the case of northern Uganda, Adam Branch’s view that the coun-
ter insurgency policy of the Ugandan government of forcefully displacing 
people in camps disastrously complicated humanitarian conditions of the 
displaced, smacks dangerous motives masquerading in the state’s protec-
tion policy (Branch 2011: 91). Branch indicates that there were unholy alli-
ances between the government of Uganda and aid agencies who moreo-
ver looked at violence against anti-government elements as humanitarian 
(ibid). Ignoring the factor of hidden intent compromises computation of 
39 Mamdani, Mahmood, 2010: 65
40 Story narrated by Abalo Ketty, a survivor in Attiak, November 2014.
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death numbers. Large numbers of death was a wake up call for the inter-
national community and international press to get concerned about deaths 
in Darfur, Rwanda, and Kosovo. Numbers can also not be correctly estab-
lished if the secondary causes of death such as deaths from malnutrition, 
drought, humanitarian hazards, and diseases are not taken into considera-
tion. The world Food Programme was able to concentrate on such cases in 
the context of Darfur (Mamdani, 2010: 27). To Mamdani, numbers are not 
meant to portray mathematical accuracy but to show the scale of mortality. 
In transitional period the scale of mortality should correspond to the scale 
of restorative, compensatory, or resettlement interventions. Planners and 
interventionists use statistics of numbers of survivors as well as numbers 
of the dead. There is a sense in which numbers of the dead help illumi-
nate numbers and conditions of survivors or victims. In transitional period 
numbers should not only concentrate on figures of mortality. Figures of the 
war injured are equally important. Adina Foundation, an NGO working in 
Lira and Alebtong districts have interacted with 4756 mutilated children in 
northern Uganda, many of these being victims of the violence of war such 
as land mines, physical mutilation by the LRA, and morbidity caused by 
diseases in the war torn areas. Adina Foundation solicits funds for correc-
tive surgery and psychosocial support to such children. More than 450 chil-
dren have so far undergone corrective surgery. This is the sense in which 
the rhetoric of numbers helps in convincing humanitarian individuals and 
organizations about the need for support to societies emerging from the 
horrors of war.
Findings and conclusions
First, transitional reforms in post-war societies call for inclusivity of actors 
and measures that embrace different juridical and non-juridical systems, 
a consideration of multiple temporalities, including pre-war periods as 
analytical frames in which roots of war are sown. In northern Uganda, it 
is then, not accurate to say that the LRA war started in 1986. The seeds 
of that war were sown in the conflicts preceding it. A significant conclu-
sion is that because such conflicts were not effectively resolved they of-
fered fertile grounds on which the LRA war sprouted. By definition, war 
becomes tensions and violence arising from the consequence of poorly 
resolved conflicts.
Second, the national court systems were/are not better options to 
handle post-war conflicts in northern Uganda. National court systems use 
erudite systems that cannot inclusively explore truth telling, reconciliation, 
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and reparation to the exact aspirations of quotidian survivors. Knowledge 
of traditional justice systems is extensively in Acholi. In Lango and Teso, 
people remember nostalgically, the historical practices that are no longer 
in force. Religious influences have also made many to shun such practices 
as heathen. For effective application of justice after war, the power of his-
tory needed is a depoliticized type in which people do no engage ethnic, 
political, and religious biases in defining key historical moments. Ordinary 
people should be involved in defining what is meant by peace, justice, sur-
vivor, government, and trial. Views they provide can guide governments 
and aid actors in applying better transitional options. For example, while 
doing scientific research on things like nodding disease, local herbalists 
can also be engaged.
Third, after conventional wars, there are hidden wars manifesting as 
land wrangles, trauma, disease, and moral decay that policy makers and 
interventionists must address. These are seeds of future wars once they 
are not addressed. Worthwhile Interventions focus on health, education, 
entrepreneurship, and legal sectors in ways that minimize these potential 
threats to peace.
Fourth, war is not necessarily a one-dimensional experience of trag-
edy and loss. War is also opportunity and gain for some. To avoid double 
jeopardy or double gain, it is important that survivors are not taken as a 
universal category. There is a clear distinction between survivors of war 
and victims of war. This distinction calls for measures that can effectively 
transform victims of war into survivors during transitional period. Survi-
vors of war should be the vital beneficiaries of post-war interventions in a 
manner that rebuilds peace, but at the same time restores justice. Regula-
tory mechanisms that protect capitalistic expropriation of resources in sur-
viving communities are an essential requirement in supporting commu-
nity by-laws, and local government ordinances. While ensuring freedom 
of economic activities in surviving communities, such freedom has often 
tended to benefit local capitalists and not survivors and victims. This calls 
for market regulations that boost production and marketing potentials of 
surviving communities. Free, unregulated market benefits capital only.
Fifth, legal inclusivity and alternative justice practices are useful 
benchmarks in negotiating relations between different categories of sur-
vivors on the one hand, and perpetrators and victims on the other. Such 
inclusivity encompasses consideration of laws that governed rebels while 
they were in the bush. Some laws and systems that governed their opera-
tions in the bush may be applied, to see whether in engaging those laws, 
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the rebels operated within allowable limits. Lastly, while designing policies 
in returned communities, the histories and cultures of survivors offer tran-
sitory frames that can proactively guide interventions. You cannot distrib-
ute seeds, or ox-ploughs that survivors will be reluctant to use because it 
would be ahistorical to their memories and cultures.
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